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I. INTRODUCTION
If knowledge is power, then certainly the secret and unlimited acquisition
of the most detailed knowledge about the most intimate aspects of a
person’s thoughts and actions conveys extraordinary power over that
683
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person’s life and reputation to the snooper who possesses the highly
personal information. And by vastly expanding the range and power of
the snooper’s eyes, ears, and brains, the new technology facilitates and
magnifies the acquisition and use of such information. Moreover, as long
as surveillance technology remains unregulated and continues to grow at
an accelerated rate, the free and enriching exercise of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights will inevitably be
chilled to the point of immobility by the general awareness that Big
Brother commands the tools of omniscience.1
Modern technological advancements have sparked an increased level of caution
as individuals seek to guard private information. As cellular phones, scanners,
scramblers and the like become more common in average American households, it
becomes obvious that high tech devices have become readily attainable by the public
at large. Accordingly, protection of information once held private by merely
“shutting the door” or “whispering” has, perhaps, become a luxury of the past.
Accordingly, while technology provides more efficient methods of completing
everyday tasks, it may also serve as one of this generation’s most formidable foes.
Absent appropriate regulation, technologies pertaining to surveillance may encroach
upon individual privacy in ways not contemplated by current legislation.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19682 (hereinafter
“Federal Wiretap Act”), as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 19863 (hereinafter “EPCA”) and the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act4 (hereinafter “1994 Amendments”), serves as the primary federal
law with respect to the regulation of surveillance activity. More specifically, Title III
of the Federal Wiretap Act, as amended, remains the “primary law guarding the
privacy of personal communication [among private citizens] in the United States.”5
This piece of legislation will serve as the focal point of this Note.
Currently before the Supreme Court of the United States6 is the case of Bartnicki
v. Vopper.7 In this case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the appellants
had successfully demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the portion of Title III
which grants a civil cause of action to anyone whose “. . . [illegally intercepted] wire,
1

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG., SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY III
(Comm. Print 1976).
2

Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520).

3

Pub. L. No. 99-508, 101(c)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 1851 (1986). (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102521).
4

Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202(a), 108 Stat. 4279 (1994). (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510).

5

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556 [hereinafter
S. REP. NO. 541].
6
David L. Hudson Jr., staff attorney for the First amendment Center at Vanderbilt
University, in an article written for the ABA Journal, stated that this case might “arguably [be]
the most important First Amendment case this term.” David L. Hudson, Speaking of Firsts ...
First Amendment Free-Speech Cases May Turn Into Blockbusters, 86 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at
30.
7

200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000).
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oral, or electronic communication . . . [is] disclosed”8 on the premise that such
regulation violates the discloser’s free speech rights under the First Amendment.9
This holding in support of the First Amendment rights of the discloser stands in
direct opposition to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in support of the
victim’s privacy rights in the similar case of Boehner v. McDermott.10
This Note will first discuss the history and context of the statute under which
these cases have arisen. It will then survey various Supreme Court cases addressing
the tension between the First Amendment and the right to privacy so as to provide
the reader with a better understanding of the conflict between these two
constitutional rights. Then it will outline and analyze the positions held by the Third
and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals. Since the Supreme Court has elected to resolve
the conflict among the federal circuits, this Note will ultimately attempt to provide a
solution that best honors the opposing interests and establishes a uniform rule with
respect to the federal government’s ability to regulate in this area.11
II. THE STATUTE IN GENERAL – HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
WIRETAP ACT
The advent of modern technology allows law enforcement agencies and private
citizens to eavesdrop with ease, making it imperative for the Court to expand the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment so as to protect individuals from misuse of such
technologies. According to its original interpretation, the Fourth Amendment was
literally limited in its application to unreasonable intrusions into a citizen’s “houses,
papers and effects.”12 Accordingly, arguments have been made that electronic
surveillance devices do not violate the provisions of the Fourth Amendment because
no actual physical intrusion necessarily occurs. This view was aptly illustrated in
Olmstead v. United States,13 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that
merely tapping someone’s telephone line without actually entering his property was
not a violation of the person’s Fourth Amendment rights because “those who
intercepted the projected voices were not in the house of either party to the
conversation.”14 Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, however, stated that:
Ways may some day be developed by which the [g]overnment, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
8

18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000).

9

The statute does require that the discloser of the information “[know] or [have] reason to
know that the information was obtained [using an illegal wiretap as defined by the statute.]”
Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c).
10
191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d by, remanded by, No. 98-7156, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27798, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 2001).
11
At the time this Note was authored the Court had not yet ruled in Bartnicki. It’s ruling,
however, will pre-date the publication date of this Note due to the time delay involved in the
publication process.
12

U.S. CONST. amend IV.

13

277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).

14

Id.
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which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences
of the home … Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection
against such invasions of individual security?15
Some thirty-nine years later, in Katz v. United States,16 the Court accepted the
view expressed by Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent. In Katz, the defendant had been
convicted under a federal statute prohibiting transmission of wagering information
by telephone.17 The conviction, however, resulted from the introduction of
surveillance evidence acquired by law enforcement officials.18 FBI agents had
“attached an electronic listening . . . device to the outside of the public telephone
booth from which the defendant had placed his calls.”19 Overturning the lower
court’s ruling that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred,20 the Supreme
Court concluded that “[t]he [g]overnment’s activities in electronically listening to
and recording [the defendant’s] words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”21 This finding by the Court marked
a significant expansion of Fourth Amendment applicability as it afforded protection
to “people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and seizures.”22
The Court noted that application of the Fourth Amendment could no longer turn
upon the “presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”23
This decision set the stage for the Congressional enactment of legislation affording
statutory protection against the unreasonable use of surveillance technology.
In the year following Katz, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,24 the partial purpose of which was “to deal with increasing
threats to privacy resulting from the growing use of sophisticated electronic
devices.”25 Title III of the Act26 placed restrictions (absent a warrant to the contrary)
15

Id. at 474.

16

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

17

Generally speaking, the statute imposes criminal penalties upon those “engaged in the
business of betting or wagering [who] knowingly use[ ] a wire communication facility for the
transmission . . . of bets or wagers . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2002).
18

Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.

19

Id.

20
See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d by, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). The court of appeals rejected the Fourth Amendment claim stating that “[t]here was
no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner].”
21

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

This Act attempted to update the Federal Communications Act of 1934. See S. REP. NO.
90-1097, at 70 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 [hereinafter S. REP. NO.
1097].
25

State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197, 201 (Kan. 1984) (citing United States v. Carroll, 332 F.
Supp. 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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upon the interception and disclosure of information obtained through wiretapping or
other means of interception. Despite Congress’ efforts to adequately update the law,
the provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act soon became outdated as well. For
example, under its original terms, the Act’s applicability did not reach the
interception of conversations using electronic equipment.27 Recognizing that its
original provisions had not kept up with technological advancements, Senator
Leahy28 commented that the existing law was “hopelessly out of date,”29 and
proposed the EPCA in 1986.
Surprisingly, even the amended provisions of the EPCA failed to accurately
define Congress’ intent for an extended period of time.30 Under its original
provisions, the Federal Wiretap Act failed to protect conversations made on cordless
or cellular phones (and the like).31 As was the case previously, technology continued
to advance making cordless and cell phones common household commodities. It
was not until 1994 that Congress once again amended the Federal Wiretap Act so as
to include cordless and cellular phones.32
In its current form, pursuant to the 1986 and 1994 Amendments, the Federal
Wiretap Act, provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who–
...
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person
the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or
having reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication in violation of
this subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral
or electronic communication, knowingly or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral or
electronic communication in violation of this subsection . . . shall be
punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as
provided in subsection (5).33
Furthermore, it goes on to provide:
(a) In general. Except as provided in § 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose
wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
26

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 et seq. (2002).

27

See S. REP. NO. 1097, supra note 24, at 70. Under it’s original terms the Act only
applied to interceptions that could be heard by the human ear.
28

The bill was co-sponsored in 1986 with Senator Mathias.

29

S. REP. NO. 541, supra note 5, at 2.

30

McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1995).

31

Id.

32

See supra note 4.

33

18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (c) – (d) (2000).
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intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover
from the person or entity which engaged in the violation such relief as
may be appropriate.34
Ardent First Amendment advocates seem to find these sections offensive due to the
limitations placed on the discloser’s ability to disseminate acquired information.
While the statute does seem to avoid a carte blanch restriction by imposing liability
only when the discloser “knows” or has “reason to know” that the information was
obtained in violation of the statute, free speech advocates presumably feel that any
limitation on an individual’s ability to disseminate information is inappropriate.
Conversely, advocates of the right to privacy may argue that, while free speech is an
important constitutional privilege, its use, under appropriate guidelines, may be
curtailed so as to protect the interests of the citizenry. Obviously, both viewpoints
are well taken and arguable on many different fronts. However, co-existence of
these interests, unless carefully defined, seems to be improbable.
It is these provisions, and the constitutional quandary they present, that serves as
the point of contention in the Bartnicki and Boehner cases discussed in Section III.
It is important to realize that, while not indicated anywhere in the statute itself, the
Senate may have foreseen the potential conflicts between the First Amendment and
the right of privacy.35 Nevertheless Congress’ failure to expressly address the issue
has produced the litigation now before the United States Supreme Court.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW ADDRESSING THE TENSION BETWEEN
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Whether Congress foresaw the possibility of conflict between the First
Amendment and the right to privacy or not, while interesting, provides no significant
assistance in resolving the conflicts now before the Supreme Court. Furthermore,
while it may appear that these conflicts are only now arising (in the form of the
Bartnicki case), such an assumption would be a far cry from reality. In fact, as
discussed infra, the Supreme Court has pondered these issues, and how they relate,
numerous times over the past thirty years. Consequently, an assessment of such
considerations will greatly assist the reader in understanding the direction in which
the Court has been moving over the past three decades, in addition to the fervor with
which it has sought to protect both of these paramount constitutional rights. This
section will survey the most significant cases that the Supreme Court has heard with
respect to these issues.
In June of 1971 the Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. United States,36
made a bold ruling with regard to the government’s ability to restrict the press. This
case involved the possible publication of a classified study entitled “History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy” that had been illegally acquired by
The New York Times and the Washington Post.37 Finding the study to be of
significant public interest, the two newspapers prepared to publish the contents of the
34

18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2000) (amended 2001).

35

See S. REP. NO. 1097, supra note 24, at 2181.

36

403 U.S. 713 (1971). These cases have often been called the “Pentagon Papers” cases
due to the fact the classified documents had been removed from the Pentagon.
37

United State v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.3d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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report.38 In an effort to prevent disclosure of this classified information, the
government unsuccessfully sought injunctions from the district courts of both the
District of Columbia and the Southern District of New York.39 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the lower court’s refusal to grant an
injunction while the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case for
further hearings.40
The United States Supreme Court held, in a per curium opinion, that the
government had failed to meet the burden of showing ample justification for the
imposition of prior restraint of expression.41 In his concurrence, Justice Douglas,
quoting the First Amendment, determined that according to the text alone there is
“no room for governmental restraint on press.”42 Further illustrating his point, he
noted that no federal statute forbade the publication of such information.43 The
Court, however, did recognize that restraint may not always be inappropriate. Justice
Brennan, in his concurrence, wrote “our judgments in the present cases may not be
taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and
restraining orders to block publication of material sought to be suppressed by the
Government.”44 Curiously, no mention was made of the fact that the information
was obtained illegally. The Court’s only concern seemed to be the prevention of
unbridled suppression of the newspapers. Justice Burger, however, in his dissent,
felt that the Court did not know the facts and was in no better position than were the
lower courts to resolve the conflict.45 Accordingly, he felt these cases were anything
but “simple.”46 Even if the facts had been known, though, he still reasoned that the
First Amendment is not an “absolute.”47 Justices Harlan and Blackmun also wrote
dissenting opinions further illustrating the Court’s division with respect to the
application of the First Amendment in cases where it offends privacy. Thus began
the Supreme Court’s thirty-year debate regarding the tension between the First
Amendment and the right to privacy.
Four years later, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,48 the Court considered, in
light of the First Amendment, the constitutionality of a Georgia statute which made it

38

Id.

39

Id.

40
See U.S. v. N.Y. Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713
(1971). Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aff’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
41

N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (citing Bantam Books v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) noting that “[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity”)
42

N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).

43

Id.

44

Id. at 724-25.

45

Id. at 748 (Burger, J., dissenting).

46

Id.

47

N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 748.

48

420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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a misdemeanor “to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim.”49 In
that case, the appellee’s seventeen-year-old daughter had been raped and killed.50
Six months after the incident hearings were held in which five of six defendants pled
guilty to the alleged crimes.51 During the course of the proceedings, a reporter
learned the identity of the victim by reading the indictments that were made available
to him by the court.52 He subsequently broadcasted the victim’s identity on a local
television station (Cox Broadcasting).53 Soon thereafter, the appellee filed suit.
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court determined that the lower court had
erroneously found a cause of action arising from the statute at issue.54 Instead, the
proper cause of action, according to the Georgia Supreme Court, lay in the common
law torts of “public disclosure” or “invasion of privacy.”55 The court did, however,
address the First Amendment issue holding that the statute did not violate the
Constitution.56 Citing Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association,57 the court stated that
“the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the
right to privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum of
intrusion upon the other.”58 Accordingly, the court sustained the statute as a
“legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression contained in the First
Amendment.”59
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Supreme Court, holding
that “[s]tates may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information
contained in official court records open to public inspection.”60 This ruling did not
come at the total expense of privacy interests. The Court provided exhaustive
comments on the importance of the right to privacy and its development over the
past century of American jurisprudence.61 However, recognizing the importance of
public awareness of public activities in the context of political activity, the Court
highlighted the fact that the information at issue came from public records.62
Therefore, despite their importance, “[privacy interests] fade when the information
49

Id. at 471 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972)).

50

Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 471.

51

Id. at 472.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 473-74.

54

Id. at 474.

55

Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 474.

56

Id. at 475.

57

483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).

58

Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 475.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 495.

61

Id. at 487 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890)).
62

Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 493.
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involved already appears on the public record.”63 The Court also feared the
“chilling” effect that might result by validating sanctions for the publication of
“certain public information.”64 Such a ruling, in the eyes of the Court, “would invite
timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the suppression of many items
that would otherwise be published . . . .”65
The Court’s next decision in this area arose two years later in Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County.66 In that case, the District Court of Oklahoma
County enjoined members of the media from publishing the identity of an elevenyear-old boy who had appeared before the court on second-degree murder charges.67
Having not held the hearings in private, as was permissible under Oklahoma law, the
judge sought to maintain the minor’s privacy by enjoining, any disclosure by the
media after the fact.68 Such restrictions were not well received by the media and
resulted in the filing of an “application for prohibition and mandamus challenging
the order as a prior restraint on the press” in violation of the First Amendment.69
This challenge was subsequently denied by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.70
Recalling Cox, as well as its then most recent decision in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart,71 the Court affirmed its belief that information in the public
domain should not be suppressed.72 Because the district court judge failed to
conduct private hearings that would have prevented the information from entering
the public record, the information passed beyond the reach of suppression and
became protected under the First Amendment.73 Accordingly, the Court reversed.74
Following Oklahoma Publishing, the Court heard Landmark Communications v.
Virginia.75 This case differed from the previous cases in that the disclosed
63
Id. at 494-95. Note, however, that while this ruling does strike a blow to privacy
interests, the Court’s holding is quite narrow. Refusing to state a broad rule, the Court plainly
stated that “it is appropriate to focus [only] on the narrow[ ] interface between press and
privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the
accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records. …” Id. at 491.
64

Id. at 496.

65

Id.

66

430 U.S. 308 (1977).

67

Id. at 308-09.

68

Id. at 309.

69

Id. at 308.

70

Id. at 309.

71

427 U.S. 539 (1976).

72

Oklahoma Publ’g Co., 430 U.S. at 310-11 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
362-63 (1966) (“[T]here is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that
transpire in the courtroom.”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“Those who see and
hear what transpired [in the courtroom] can report it with impunity.”)).
73

Oklahoma Publ’g Co., 430 U.S. at 311.

74

Id. at 312.

75

435 U.S. 829 (1978).
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information in question was not acquired from review of documents in the public
domain. In this case, a newspaper (Landmark) reported on a pending judicial
inquiry76 identifying the state judge whose conduct was under investigation.77 The
newspaper’s conduct was held to be a violation of Virginia law which made it illegal
to “[divulge] the identification of a Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge
was the subject of an investigation and hearing. …”78 Rejecting, inter alia, the
newspaper’s First Amendment defense, the trial court found the newspaper guilty
and ordered payment of a fine and court costs.79 The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the lower court by resolving the First Amendment question through
application of the “clear and present danger” test.80 It concluded that the three main
functions that the statute sought to accomplish81 justified the belief that, “absent a
requirement of confidentiality, the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission could
not function properly or discharge effectively its intended purpose.”82
The United States Supreme Court, rejecting the Supreme Court of Virginia’s
application of the “clear and present danger” test,83 determined that the “narrow and
limited question presented … is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal
punishment of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry … for divulging or
publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings. …”84 Because
the information contained in the article was factually accurate and pertained to a
“legislatively authorized inquiry,” the Court considered it to be of public
significance.85 Citing Mills v. Alabama, the Court noted that “a major purpose of

76

The judicial inquiry was being conducted by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission. Id. at 831.
77

Id.

78

Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1973) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because such hearings were confidential it was apparent that the paper’s acquisition
of the information arose from a “leak.” Someone had violated the Commission’s
confidentiality and provided the paper with the information. Id.
79

Id.

80

Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 833.

81

The three functions identified by the Court were:
[1] protection of a judge’s reputation from the adverse publicity which might flow
from frivolous complaints, [2] maintenance of confidence in the judicial system by
preventing the premature disclosure of a complaint before the Commission has
determined that the charge is well founded, and [3] protection of complainants and
witnesses from possible recrimination by prohibiting disclosure until the validity of
the complaint has been ascertained. Id.
82

Id.

83

Id. at 842.

84

Id. at 837. In doing so, the Court drew attention to its refusal to consider a situation in
which someone illegally obtains information and then divulges it. Id. This marks a major
distinction between Landmark and Bartnicki.
85

Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 839.
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[the First] Amendment [is] to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”86
Accordingly, the Court found that the “[c]ommonwealth’s interests advanced by the
imposition of criminal sanctions [were] insufficient to justify the actual and potential
encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press.”87
Landmark is distinguishable from the Court’s previous ruling in Cox. In
Landmark, the statute in question provided criminal penalties rather than civil relief
for the dissemination of information not yet in the public domain.88 Continuing its
conservative interpretive approach, the Landmark Court provided yet another limited
holding, answering only the narrow question presented by the specific facts of the
case.89
Only one year later the Court again granted review to a case involving the First
Amendment and the right to privacy. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the
Court considered “whether a West Virginia statute violat[ed] the First Amendment[]
. . . by making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the written approval of
the juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.”90 In this
case, a fourteen-year-old youth shot and killed a fellow classmate at a local school.91
Having been identified by seven of his classmates, he was arrested by police.92
Hearing the report on a police radio, reporters from the Charleston Daily Mail and
the Charleston Gazette went to the school where they learned the assailant’s
identity.93 Aware of the statute, the Daily Mail refrained from releasing the youth’s
name in the story.94 The Gazette, however, published his name and picture.95
Assuming the information to now be “public information” the Daily Mail
subsequently published the name as well.96
Following an indictment against them, the newspapers immediately sought a writ
of prohibition against the prosecuting attorney and the circuit court judges claiming
that the indictment was based on charges arising from statutes that oppose, inter alia,
the First Amendment.97 Considering the Supreme Court’s previous rulings on this
issue, the West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned “that the statute operated as a prior
restraint on speech and that the State’s interest in protecting the identity of the
86
Id. at 838 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87

Id.

88

Id. at 840.

89

Id. at 838.

90

Smith, 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979).

91

Id. at 99.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Smith, 443 U.S. at 99.

96

Id. at 100.

97

They filed an original jurisdiction petition directly with the West Virginia Supreme
Court. Id.
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juvenile offender did not overcome the heavy presumption against the
constitutionality of such prior restraints” and issued the writ of prohibition.98
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed with a typical, narrow
holding limited only to the specific facts of the case.99 Again refusing to set a broadbased standard, the Court looked only to the facts, the disclosure of a juvenile
offender’s identity, and held that the State’s interests in protecting the anonymity of
the juvenile is not sufficient to justify criminal sanctions against those who
disseminate such information.100 Recognizing that no prior ruling specifically
controlled, the Court did acknowledge that “recent decisions demonstrate that state
action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards.”101
Distinguishing Cox, Landmark and Oklahoma
Publishing, the Court still determined that “if the information is lawfully obtained . .
. the state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further an interest
more substantial than is present here.”102 It is important to note, however, that such a
ruling, while seemingly detrimental to privacy interests, remains extremely limited in
its applicability.103 Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., stated that “recognition [of the importance of free speech] has not
meant that [it] always prevails over competing interests of the public . . . . So valued
is the liberty of speech . . . there is a tendency in cases such as this to accept virtually
any contention supported by a claim of interference with speech or press.”104
Clearly, this leaves the door open to the possibility that privacy interests, properly
protected by a statute, may withstand First Amendment scrutiny.105
The steady progression of cases until to this point was followed by a ten year dry
spell of judicial activity in this area. It was not until 1989 that the Supreme Court, in
The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,106 considered the clash between the First Amendment and
privacy, holding that a Florida statute, which made it unlawful to “print, publish or
broadcast . . . in any instrument of mass communication”107 the name of a sexual
assault victim, did not comport with the First Amendment.108

98

Id.

99

Id. at 105.

100

Smith, 443 U.S. at 106.

101

Id. at 102.

102

Id. at 104.

103

Despite continued rulings in favor of the First Amendment, the United States Supreme
Court has, in every case, been clear that its rulings are not to be interpreted broadly. See
Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v.
Oklahoma, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broad. Corp., v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
104

Smith, 443 U.S. at 106-07.

105

Bartnicki v. Vopper, see infra Section IV, poses a situation that may justify such
suppression.
106

491 U.S. 524 (1989).

107

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 1987).

108

The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 526.
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In that case, the appellee, B.J.F., reported that she had been robbed and sexually
assaulted.109 The report generated from her interview with police included her
identity and was placed in the police department’s pressroom where a reportertrainee of The Florida Star copied it.110 In violation of its own policy, The Florida
Star then included the victim’s identity in an article it published.111 Subsequently,
B.J.F. filed suit claiming that The Florida Star had violated Florida law by
publishing her identity.112 After rejecting The Florida Star’s motion to dismiss on
First Amendment grounds, the trial judge ruled that “§ 794.03 [the statute in
question] was constitutional because it reflected a proper balance between the First
Amendment and privacy rights, as it applied only to a narrow set of ‘rather sensitive
. . . criminal offenses.’ ”113 The First District Court of Appeals affirmed and the
Supreme Court of Florida denied discretionary review.114 Consequently, the United
States Supreme Court granted review.
Once again recognizing the “narrow holdings” of the past,115 the Court ultimately
held in favor of the First Amendment and reversed the lower court’s imposition of
damages against The Florida Star.116 Because the information had not yet “entered
the public domain,” the Court distinguished the case from Cox and determined that
the Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. mode of analysis should apply.117
Applying this test, the Court first found that the newspaper had “lawfully
obtained” the information because it was readily made available by the police.118
The Court did not, determine that the “state’s interests” (protection of a victim’s
anonymity) justified suppression under the facts of this case. The Court did clearly
state, though, that “[it does] not rule out the possibility that, in a proper case,
imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might be so
overwhelmingly necessary to advance these interests as to satisfy the Daily Mail
standard.”119 Additionally, the Court called into question the actual effectiveness of

109

Id. at 527.

110

Id.

111

Id. at 528.

112

Id.

113

The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528.

114

Id. at 529.

115

“Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the
future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily.” Id. at
532. Such a position by the Court may prove beneficial for privacy interests in Barnicki, infra
Section IV.
116

Id. at 541.

117

Id. at 533. The Court was referring to the Daily Mail standard which holds that “[I]f a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order.” Smith, 433 U.S. at 103.
118

The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536.

119

Id. at 537.
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the Florida law because it only limited disclosure in the context of “instrument[s] of
mass communication.”120
Last, but certainly not least, in 1991 the Court heard Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co.121 Unlike many of the Court’s prior rulings, the media defendant in Cohen was
held liable for damages, notwithstanding First Amendment protection.122 In this
case, Dan Cohen, a Republican associated with the Republican gubernatorial
campaign of 1982, approached members of the press of two different newspapers
with information regarding one of the candidates.123 In doing so, he made it
abundantly clear that disclosure of this information was premised on a promise of
confidentiality.124 Despite a promise to the contrary, the editorial staffs of the two
newspapers decided to disclose Cohen’s identity in their stories.125 Subsequently,
Cohen sued claiming fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.126
Rejecting the newspapers’ First Amendment argument, the trial court awarded a
verdict in favor of Cohen.127 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim but upheld the breach of contract claim.128
Subsequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the breach of contract claim
(under promissory estoppel) reasoning that it is still necessary to weigh the
competing First Amendment interests when determining whether a free speech
violation has occurred.129 In so doing, the court concluded that the “enforcement of
the promise of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel theory would violate [the]
defendant’s First Amendment rights.”130
Surprisingly, in light of the previous cases discussed, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court finding no First Amendment
violation.131 The Court determined that the Daily Mail rule, generally allowing
publication of lawfully obtained information absent a need to further a state interest
of the highest order, was inapplicable in this case.132 Rather, the Court classified the
promissory estoppel cause of action as a law of “general applicability.”133 In short,
120

Id. at 540.

121

501 U.S. at 663 (1991).

122

Cohen, 501 U.S. at 663.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 666.

126

Id.

127

Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666.

128

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990).
129

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S. 663
(1991).
130

Id.

131

Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.

132

Id.

133

Id. at 670.
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“generally applicable” laws fail to single out a particular entity; rather, they equally
restrict the citizenry at large.134 Consequently, a separate line of case law was
determined to govern the facts of this case.135
It has been held that “generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”136 Accordingly, the press has
remained limited in its newsgathering activities in many areas.137 This being the
case, the Court determined that “enforcement of such general laws against the press
is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other
persons or organizations.”138 Accordingly, the Court distinguished Florida Star and
Daily Mail by pointing out the fact that they involved statues that specifically limited
the content of publications.139 Here, however, the only question at issue was whether
the press should be held to its promise of confidentiality. Such a requirement in no
way attempts to specifically limit speech, and, therefore, escapes the strict scrutiny
test of Florida Star and Daily Mail.140
IV. THE CURRENT CLASH BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRIVACY
Against this thirty-year background of case law, the Supreme Court has chosen,
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, to once again address this controversial issue. Only this time
it will do so in the context of a federal statute and as a result of a split in decisions
among the federal circuit courts of appeals. Perhaps it is time for the Court to
provide some finality in this area rather than crafting its holding as narrowly as it has
chosen to do in the past.
A. State of the Law in the D.C. Circuit – Bartnicki v. Vopper
From 1992 to 1994 the Wyoming Valley West School District was in contract
negotiations with the Wyoming Valley West School District Teacher’s Union.141
The negotiations were of significant public interest and served to generate frequent
134

See id.

135

Id. at 669.

136

Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.

137

See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (stating that press
may not publish copyrighted materials); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (stating that
reporters must respond to grand jury subpoena and reveal confidential source if asked to do
so); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (stating that media must obey the
National Labor Relations Act).
138

Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.

139

Id.

140

The dissent in Cohen stated that this case was not one of “generally applicable laws.”
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, even if it were, the dissenters
felt the result should differ. Id. The dissent, citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988), reminded the majority that Hustler involved “generally applicable laws” as
well. Id. Yet, it was held that suppression of a satirical critique violated the First
Amendment. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674.
141

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

15

698

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:683

media attention. Gloria Bartnicki (plaintiff), the chief negotiator, and Anthony Kane
(plaintiff), a teacher, served as the primary negotiators.142 Jack Yocum, one of
several defendants, served as president of a local taxpayer organization opposing the
union proposals.143 In 1993, Bartnicki and Kane participated in a phone conversation
that was intercepted and recorded by an anonymous individual who subsequently left
the recording in Yocum’s mailbox.144 Because the tape contained statements
amounting to the use of violence against the School Board, Yocum seized the
opportunity and passed the tape along to the local media who, in turn, disseminated it
over the radio, on television and in some newspapers.145
Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum and several media defendants alleging
violations of the Federal Wiretap Act146 and several state laws.147 The district court
denied each party’s motion for summary judgment and determined that the federal
statute in question did not violate the First Amendment.148 On appeal to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendants successfully argued that application of
§§ 2511 and 2520,149 in relevant part, violated their First Amendment rights150 by
imposing upon them civil liability for disclosure of communications intercepted in
violation of the Act.
Recognizing the inapplicability and limited nature of past holdings,151 the court
declined to “apply[] a test gleaned from Cox and its progeny, [but elected to review]
First Amendment principles in light of the unique facts and circumstances of this
case.”152 First, the court questioned the district court’s “general applicability”
analysis, but failed to address it at length because, even if correct, the court felt that
the district court applied the Cohen rule far too broadly, thus reaching an immature
conclusion.153 A finding of “generally applicable” status does not, per Cohen, justify
suppression of speech, as the district court’s quick resolution of the issue implies.
Rather, in Cohen, the Court stated that, “enforcement of such general laws against
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement
against other persons or organizations” (emphasis added).154 Therefore, a balancing
142

Id. at 113.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

28 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2000).

147

For purposes of this Note, only the federal law claims will be addressed.

148

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 113. In so doing the district court held, in reliance upon Cohen v.
Cowles Media, Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), that the statutes are laws of “general applicability”
and of no offense to the First Amendment. Id.
149

See supra Section I for relevant text of the statutes.

150

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129.

151

See supra notes 36-139, and accompanying text.

152

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 117.

153

Id. at 118.

154

Id. (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991)).
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of interests is still necessary. The primary question then became whether to use the
standard of “strict” or “intermediate” scrutiny.155
Finding intermediate scrutiny applicable, the court considered two arguments
posed by the government.156 The first argument attempted to classify the defendant’s
actions as “expressive conduct” rather than “pure speech,” thus justifying its evasion
of strict First Amendment scrutiny.157 So categorized, the conduct would fall under
intermediate scrutiny analysis as expressed in United States v. O’Brien.158 In that
case, the Court reasoned that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ [sic] elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech [sic] elements can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms.”159 Rejecting this argument, the Bartnicki court
found that the acts of “disclosing” and “publishing” constitute speech and not
expressive conduct, thus invalidating the government’s intermediate scrutiny
argument.160
The court did accept the government’s second argument favoring the use of
intermediate scrutiny based on “content-neutral” regulation.161 Citing Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence,162 the court recognized that such restrictions
are valid provided they “are [1] justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and [3] that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of information.”163 Such a determination, however, is only half the
battle. In balancing state interests (defined by the purpose of the law) against First
Amendment concerns, the court ultimately determined that (1) the manner in which
the government claimed the statute serves its interests is too “indirect” to justify
suppression,164 and (2) the statute is not sufficiently narrow to accomplish state
interests without unnecessarily interfering with the First Amendment.165
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the statute in question violated the First
Amendment.166
Dissenting in Bartnicki, Judge Pollak voiced disagreement only with the
majority’s application of intermediate scrutiny.167 Feeling the “state’s interests” and
155

Id. at 119.

156

Id.

157

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 119.

158

391 U.S. 367 (1968).

159

Id. at 376.

160

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 120-21.

161

Id. at 121.

162

468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

163

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 121.

164

Id. at 126.

165

See id.

166

Id. at 129.

167

Id. at 130.
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the “prohibition on third-party disclosures” to be substantially related, he reasoned
that “[u]nless disclosure is prohibited, there will be an incentive for illegal
interceptions [and] . . . the damage caused . . . will be compounded.”168 He also
recognized the substantial state legislative support (distinguishing Landmark) as
evidence of widespread support for limited suppression of disclosure.169
B. State of the Law in the 3rd Circuit – Boehner v. McDermott
In December of 1996 John Boehner, a plaintiff and a member of the House of
Representatives, participated in a conference call with several other high-ranking
Republicans regarding their strategy in response to an expected announcement by the
Ethic’s Subcommittee that had been preparing to investigate ethics violations of
then-Speaker Newt Gingrich.170 Boehner’s participation in the call occurred from his
cell phone while driving through northern Florida.171 Two Florida residents, using a
radio scanner, intercepted and recorded the conversation.172 At the recommendation
of local Democrats, the couple delivered the recording to Representative James
McDermott, the defendant and ranking Democratic member of the House Ethics
Committee, along with a letter indicating how the conversation had been
intercepted.173 Subsequently, McDermott gave copies to three national media
sources that, in turn, published the “highly public [and] significant” information.174
Following publication of the stories, the Florida couple was prosecuted under the
criminal provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act.175 One year later, Boehner filed a
civil action against McDermott pursuant to § 2520 claiming McDermott had violated
§ 2511(1)(c).176 McDermott successfully moved to dismiss, claiming the statute
violated his First Amendment right against punishment for publication of truthful
and lawfully obtained information of public significance.177 Boehner then appealed
to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.178
In reversing the trial court’s findings with regard to the First Amendment, Judge
Randolph, in an extremely logical and well-reasoned opinion, began by simply

168

Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 133.

169

Calling into question the wisdom behind the majority’s decision, Judge Pollak pointed
out that the decision “spells the demise of a portion of more than twenty other state statutes.”
Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 134.
170

Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

171

See id.

172

See id.

173

See id.

174

This information was publicly and politically significant because Speaker Gingrich had
agreed not to strategize regarding the possible investigation by the House Ethics Committee.
This conversation indicated conduct that possibly violated that agreement. See id.
175

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a) (2002), 2511(4)(b)(ii) (2002).

176

See supra Section I for text of statutes.

177

See Boehner, 191 F.3d at 466.

178

See id. at 463.
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challenging McDermott’s claim that his actions even amounted to “speech.”179
McDermott had claimed “this [to be] core political speech [lying] at the very heart of
the First Amendment.”180 The court did not agree and noted that “the tape [did] . . .
contain speech about political matters . . . [b]ut the speech is not McDermott’s and
§ 2511(1)(c) does not render him liable for anything anyone said on the recording.
[I]t is his conduct in delivering the tape that gives rise to his potential liability.”181
Recognizing the possibility of “communicative elements” in his actions, the court
concluded that the “O’Brien framework is the proper mode of First Amendment
analysis.”182 Recall that the O’Brien analysis applies to generally applicable laws
containing content-neutral prohibitions that create incidental burdens on speech.183 It
holds that such prohibitions are justified if they further “an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the . . . restriction . . . is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.”184
Ultimately finding the state’s interest to be “substantial,” the court reasoned that
the provisions of the statute actually promote free speech rather than detract from
it.185 By failing to insulate the discloser from liability, others may feel free to speak
candidly.186 Absent such a law, it is conceivable that people would refrain from
readily speaking their minds for fear that their conversation is not “private.”187
Justification was also found in the deterrent effect the statute arguably provides.188
Likening the recorded interception to stolen property, the court compared the statute
in question to laws prohibiting the receipt of stolen goods.189 Deterrence of the
original offense as the common motivation, the court held such an interest as
satisfying the O’Brien test.190
Rejecting McDermott’s contention that his “lawful” acquisition of the
information placed him under the protection of the rule set forth in Florida Star, the
court distinguished the two cases by noting that the respective statutes differed in
scope, purpose, and content.191 More significantly, however, the court analyzed a
179

Id. at 466.

180

Id.

181

Id. at 466-67.

182

Boehner, 191 F.3d at 467; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).

183

Boehner, 191 F.3d at 467.

184

Id. at 468.

185

Recognizing that the interception of a conversation violates the “freedom not to speak
publicly,” the court concluded that laws prohibiting such conduct, in fact, bolster free speech.
Id. at 469.
186

See id. at 470.

187

Id. at 468.

188

Boehner, 191 F.3d at 468-69.

189

Id. at 469-70.

190

Id.

191

See id. at 471-72.
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footnote provided by the Court in Florida Star. In relevant part, the footnote stated
that “the Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, [the]
government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing
publication as well.”192 The court went on to reason that “regardless whether the
illegality is committed by a newspaper’s reporter or by a source, if the newspaper
publishes the illegally obtained information, the First Amendment may not shield it
from punishment.”193 This directly opposed McDermott’s argument that his
“innocent” involvement protected him from liability.194 According to the court, he
was anything but “innocent.”195 The fact that the Florida couple sought immunity in
return for disclosing the tape implies that McDermott, or someone speaking on his
behalf, led them to believe it could be granted.196 Such conduct amounts, at least, to
participation.197
Citing various cases demonstrating instances in which suppression has been
upheld based on a duty of confidentiality,198 the court noted that a similar “duty”
arose from § 2511(1)(c) of the Federal Wiretap Act.199 McDermott obtained the
information under the duty of nondisclosure imposed by the statute.200 In short, the
Boehner court found ample “state interests” to justify suppression of this
information, ever mindful of the possibility that McDermott’s “disclosure” may not
even amount to “speech” protected under the First Amendment.201 Accordingly, the
D.C. Circuit has held the statute in question to be constitutional and not a violation of
the First Amendment.202
V. WHO’S RIGHT – A SUGGESTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT
Like many cases that come before the Supreme Court, this one presents an
extremely difficult question in that the opposing arguments are each grounded upon
constitutional principles that most, if not all, Americans consider fundamental.
Mindful of the First Amendment’s history203 and its evolution to its present day
192

Id. at 472 (citing The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535).

193

Boehner, 191 F.3d at 473.

194

Id. at 476.

195

Id.

196

Id.

197

Id.

198

Boehner, 191 F.3d at 476.

199

Id. at 477.

200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Id. at 478.

203

The freedom of speech and press in the United States had its origins in the common law
tradition of England. However, at the time of its inception (shortly after the Constitutional
Convention in 1791) it was not clear as to the extent to which “free speech” should reach. In
England, the freedom to speak and publish as one desired did exist; however, its limitations
arose from its failure to protect the speaker/publisher from state action after the fact.
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pinnacle as a quintessential symbol of freedom, many advocates of free speech argue
that the slightest submission on their part to the State may serve as the slippery slope
that will result in suppression of the Freedom of Speech. On the other hand, should
advocacy of the right to speak come at the expense of yet another constitutionally
protected right – privacy? Is not privacy a right most people consider paramount?
After all, it is fairly safe to assume that the average citizen is more likely to fall into
the category of people using cell phones (like Representative Boehner or Gloria
Bartnicki) than the category of people intercepting phone conversations. It would
stand to reason, then, that most would relate more readily to the privacy interest,
rather than the free speech interest.
These assumptions, whether right or wrong, are not alone sufficient to resolve the
conflict. They only attempt to illustrate the possible impression the general public
may have with regard to this clash of constitutional norms. Ultimately, resolution of
such conflicts must flow from the logical analysis of constitutional precedent and the
rule of law upon which the rights in question are grounded. Accordingly, while
emotional arguments may appear persuasive, this Note will base its conclusion
primarily on the rule of law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Which of these rights, then, if any, transcends the other? Under what
circumstances, if ever, might one take precedent over the other? Due to the broad
number of arguments and cases supporting, in whole or in part, the many views in
favor of both “privacy” and “free speech,” it is with deliberate caution that this Note
will address only a few of them to demonstrate why privacy should supercede free
speech in this situation. It would be impractical to address each and every tangential
argument posed by advocates on either side, while attempting to maintain focus on
the basic constitutional question involved. That question being, in its simplest form,
whether the privacy interests held by a participant in a phone conversation outweigh
the free speech interests (with respect to disclosure) held by a third party who has
been given an illegally (pursuant to the Federal Wiretap Act) obtained recording of
the phone conversation. This section will proffer a solution in favor of the right to
privacy while attempting to sufficiently honor the First Amendment’s right to Free
Speech.
A. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
As distinguished from the First Amendment’s guarantee of Free Speech, the right
to privacy is nowhere mentioned in the text of the constitution. Even the youngest
school child probably knows that all Americans presently enjoy such a right. If,
however, such a right exists but is not directly contained within the text of the
constitution, from where, then, does it derive its legitimacy? Furthermore, if
legitimate, must such a non-textual right automatically be pre-empted by a right like
Free Speech that clearly appears in the constitutional text?

Therefore, the citizenry were protected only from “prior restraint” by the state. While the
government could not stop a person from speaking, it was perfectly legal to later punish the
speaker for what was said. The Framers wrote the First Amendment in this context, never
really distinguishing it from its English counterpart. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING—CASES AND MATERIALS 61 (Aspen Law & Business
2000).
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It has been said that Americans, in general, favor the right to privacy far more
than their European ancestors. Darien McWhirter and Jon Bible illustrate this
phenomenon in the following example:
After the United States purchased the territory of Louisiana thousands of
people from Kentucky floated down the Mississippi river to take up
residence in New Orleans. These supposedly primitive Kentucky people
were appalled by the architecture they encountered. The homes required
people to walk through a bedroom to get to a living room, and in many
cases the stairways joining sleeping and living quarters were outside the
houses for everyone to see! The new Americans soon built homes with
hallways and indoor stairways, even though by European standards such
things were considered a waste of indoor space.
Other examples abound. Americans excelled at building fences and
invented both barbed wire and chain link. When railroads became popular
it was an American who came up with the private Pullman compartment.
In America, even the cheapest motel provides each room with a “private”
bathroom; indeed, many Americans consider the lack of such “private”
facilities the worst part of travel in Europe. When Americans felt they
could not get enough privacy in either small towns or cities, they invented
suburbs. In short, Americans have a significant concern with privacy and
in many cases have made sacrifices to satisfy this desire to “be let
alone.”204
Such examples raise the question as to why such a right was not explicitly
granted. Alternatively, however, such a seemingly gross “oversight” on the part of
the framers may indicate their acceptance of such a right as inherent and in need of
no constitutional affirmation. Judge Lambros, writing in United States v. Perkins,205
recognized that judicial protection of privacy rights are becoming more necessary
with modern technological advancements. He wrote:
The authors of the Constitution were perhaps not as concerned with the
protection of this right as they should have been. But there were so few in
this vast land that expressed concern for protection of privacy [it] must
have hardly seem justified. Through the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
however, all the protection needed was given; express delineation of a
right to privacy was not, and is not necessary.206
Nevertheless, its textual absence required the Supreme Court to justify its existence
via originalist theories of constitutional interpretation.
Justice Louis Brandeis is credited with bringing the privacy interest to the
Court.207 Following his appointment by President Wilson in 1916, Brandeis became
204

DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT – SEX,
DRUGS AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 9 (Quorum Books 1992).
205

383 F. Supp. 922, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1974).

206

Id. at 926.

207

See supra note 15.
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the occupant of what would become known as the Court’s “privacy seat.”208 As
distinguishable from prior Supreme Court Justices, Brandeis’ intent with regard to
privacy was to establish its constitutional legitimacy. However, as is the case in
American jurisprudence, judicial activism can only occur when a “case or
controversy” is brought before the Court.209 Accordingly, Brandeis’ agenda
remained restrained until 1928 when the Court heard Olmstead v. United States.210
As mentioned in Section I, Olmstead is primarily recognized for Brandeis’ rigorous
dissent to the majority’s failure to honor privacy interests.211 Despite his efforts,
though, Brandeis was unable to sway the Court to establish privacy as a
constitutional right.
Following Brandeis’ retirement, his replacement, William Douglas, continued to
carry the torch while occupying the “privacy seat.” Contrary to common occurrence,
the incoming Justice shared the views of his outgoing counterpart.212 In 1965 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority in the seminal case of Griswold v. Connecticut,213
finally established privacy as a constitutionally protected right. In that case, the
defendants had been convicted under a law that prohibited, among other things, the
use of a contraceptive.214 Refusing to uphold the law in conformity with the Lochner
line of precedent, the Court instead focused on the sacred institution of marriage in
which the use of the contraceptive device took place.215 Considering the
circumstances, the Court felt that legislative intrusion by the state into the bedroom
of a married couple violated a more fundamental right than the right held by the state
legislature to regulate in this area. Finding no textual support in the Constitution,
however, Douglas drew comparisons to peripheral rights accompanying various
express rights granted under the Bill of Rights.
For example, he reasoned, that the “association of people” and “the right to
educate a child in a school of the parent’s choice” is nowhere found in the text of the
Bill of Rights.216 Nevertheless, such rights have been sustained under the First
Amendment as being peripherally implied.217 Accordingly, the First Amendment is
said to have a “penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion.”218 Similar “penumbras,” or “zones of privacy,” were found to exist with

208

See MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 204, at 91.

209

See U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1.

210

277 U.S. 438 (1928). Recall that Olmstead involved the tapping of phone lines without
any actual trespass onto the suspect’s property.
211

See supra notes 13-15.

212

See MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 204, at 91.

213

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

214

See id. at 480 (referring to CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958 rev.)).
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Id. at 481.
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Id. at 482.
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See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

23

706

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:683

regard to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments as well.219 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the “right of privacy . . . is a legitimate one”220 and held that the
law restricting the use of contraceptives violated the more sacred right of privacy as
enjoyed within a marriage.
Two years after Griswold the Court, in Katz v. United States,221 finally overturned
Olmstead and adequately honored Brandeis’ dissent. The years following Katz
marked a turning point in privacy jurisprudence particularly in the area of criminal
prosecutions.
The Fourth Amendment experienced heavy constitutional
consideration with respect to the scope of the “search and seizure” provisions
contained therein. In any event, the efforts of Justices Brandeis and Douglas
ultimately served to provide the American people with the constitutional right to
privacy. This right is now challenged by First Amendment jurisprudence.
B. A Threshold Question – Is this Speech?
Obviously, the easiest way to evade a First Amendment challenge is to find that
the activity a statute seeks to regulate is not “speech.” While easy enough to assert,
in practice such an undertaking may pose more problems than one might think. In so
doing, however, the first step is to define “speech.” In its simplest form speech
might be defined as any oral or written communication. In fact, such a definition
was the only one that had ever been contemplated, until, in Stromberg v.
California,222 when the Court first considered a communicative action as speech
protected under the First Amendment. In that case a nineteen-year-old camp
counselor was charged with the crime of “raising the red flag.”223 California had
outlawed such conduct due to the red flag’s association with communism.224 Finding
her actions to be “symbolic speech” the Court struck down the law finding the state’s
interest in forbidding such conduct insufficient to justify suppression.225 Since 1931,
the Court has continued to expand that which it considers protected “speech” to now
include conduct as offensive as desecration of the American flag.226 Accordingly,
conduct having any sort of communicative or symbolic aspect has an excellent
chance of qualifying as “speech” under the First Amendment.227 However, such a
broad definition should not serve to eliminate asking the threshold question – “is this
speech?”
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See id. at 485.
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Id. at 486.
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389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also supra Section I.
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283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 535-36.
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See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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See, e.g., Stromberg and Texas v. Johnson, supra.
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In fact, Judge Randolph, in Boehner v. McDermott,228 began his analysis by
asking this very question. Recall that McDermott, a Democratic politician, had
received and disclosed a tape-recorded conversation that had been obtained in
violation of the Federal Wiretap Act.229 The conversation involved information that
would prove detrimental to Republican interests if made public.230 Upon receiving
the tape, he passed it along to several media sources who, in turn, published its
contents.231 His sole defense in the civil suit lodged against him was that he had a
free speech right to do whatever he wished with the information.232 Randolph’s
simple response was, “what speech?”233
In reality, all McDermott did was act as the middle-man. He received the
information and passed it along to the next entity. He neither added anything to it
nor removed anything from it. Accordingly, the disclosure of the illegally
intercepted information did not, in and of itself, convey a view held by McDermott.
How can it be said, then, that he attempted to express anything by his conduct? This
proves significant because the Court, in Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence,234 held that only “expressive” conduct is to be afforded First Amendment
protection. Expressive conduct had been determined to have a “communicative”
aspect in that it attempts to convey a viewpoint of the speaker.235 Absent this
communicative quality, conduct (even if in the form of spoken words) may not
always warrant protection under the First Amendment.236 Perhaps the only way
McDermott could have transmitted this information in a manner that clearly would
have qualified as “speech” would have been to read it to the media rather than simply
handing them the tape.237
This particular set of facts serves as the primary distinction between the Boehner
and Bartnicki cases. While each case involves the same statute and the same
circumstance involving the disclosure of an illegally obtained phone conversation, in
Bartnicki one of the defendants is the media. Curiously enough, no media defendant
was named in Boehner despite involvement not unlike the media defendant in
Bartnicki. Nevertheless, the Boehner court refused to emphatically state how it
would rule if a media defendant had been named.238
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191 F.3d 463 (1999).
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See id. at 466. The couple had intercepted the cell phone conversation in violation of
the Federal Wiretap Act.
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See Boehner, 191 F.3d at 467.
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Since the Supreme Court has chosen to review Bartnicki rather than Boehner,
undoubtedly due to media involvement, it is fair to assume that it will characterize
the defendants’ activities as “speech.” Perhaps appropriately so - for once
information is disseminated “in print” it is much more difficult to say that “speech”
has not occurred. The question that arises is whether media involvement should
greatly affect the analysis. Nevertheless, it is extremely significant that the “speech”
in question in both these cases is suspect. It is not speech in the purest sense and,
therefore, should not be treated as such.
C. A Prima Facia Case for the Constitutionality of the Federal Wiretap Act
Simply because a statute seems to oppose free speech on its face does not, per se,
mean that it will fall prey to a First Amendment challenge. To believe so would be
to hold that free speech is an absolute right. In reality, very few rights, if any, enjoy
complete autonomy from all government regulation. Perhaps the most well known
restriction on speech is the prohibition against shouting “fire” in a crowded theater
and causing a panic.239 Basing its holding on the “clear and present” danger test, the
Court has held that the result from such conduct justifies suppression. Accordingly,
not all speech is protected.
Several Supreme Court decisions analogously demonstrate the inherent
constitutional legitimacy of the Federal Wiretap Act.240 For example, in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,241 the Court upheld laws prohibiting the
disclosure of lawfully obtained trade secrets. In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation
Enters,242 the Court authorized civil penalties against those who lawfully obtain but
unlawfully publish copyrighted materials. More importantly, though, the Court
acknowledged “a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, which serves the same
ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.”243 While it is true that
these cases involve disclosure of information that was actively being protected by the
law, it is important to note that the nature of the information was not necessarily
“private.” Accordingly, the personal and private nature of the information involved
in cases like Bartnicki and Boehner should be considered even more sacred.
Perhaps the best argument against the applicability of these cases is that in each
situation there was a preexisting duty to keep silent. Therefore, on their face, it
would seem that this line of cases is distinguishable from Bartnicki. As noted by the
court in Boehner, however, the Federal Wiretap Act provided notice to the
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See, e.g., Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

240
See generally In re Motion of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating
that grand jurors who lawfully obtain knowledge of a witness’ testimony may not disclose the
information); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (prohibiting disclosure of
information contained in lawfully obtained wiretaps); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663
(1991) (enforcing a reporter’s promise to maintain the confidentiality of an informant); Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 476 U.S. 20 (1984) (issuing a court order prohibiting disclosure of
information obtained during discovery).
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433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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Id. at 559 (citing Est. of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255
(N.Y. 1968).
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defendants that they had a statutorily imposed duty not to disclose the information.244
How does the duty imposed by the statute differ from the duty imposed in the above
cases? It doesn’t. The unauthorized publication of copyrighted materials is far less
intrusive than publication of the contents of a private phone conversation. Logically,
then, it should be exponentially easier to justify civil penalties for publication of the
latter in light of the Court’s willingness to uphold laws prohibiting the former.
Accordingly, congressional suppression of the type of “speech” found in the
Bartnicki case should not necessarily offend the First Amendment. Perhaps, the
manner in which the case arrived in court provides free speech advocates with the
necessary zeal to oppose the Federal Wiretap Act.245 This is only to say that
suppressing the media, as opposed to merely a private individual, tends to raise the
eyebrows of First Amendment advocates more quickly.246 Additionally, the fact that
the information involved in Bartnicki could be classified as “publicly significant”
may serve to fan the First Amendment flame. Nevertheless, it is the privacy interest
that should serve as the focal point of this dispute. It is a constitutional right equally
deserving of protection. Free “speech” is not and has never been considered an
impenetrable fortress. As the aforementioned cases demonstrate, its walls have been
conquered in many different contexts, the least significant of which pales in
comparison to the basic right to privacy in one’s personal phone communications.
D. First Amendment Scrutiny – What Standard Applies?
Perhaps the more persuasive argument in favor of privacy lies not in the logical
consideration of prior cases permitting various types of suppression, but in the
constitutional precedents that focus on the scope and intent of the suppression a
statute seeks to achieve. Recognizing that suppression is sometimes permissible, the
Court has provided guidelines by which Congress, via legislation, may inadvertently
restrict the dissemination of information.247
The key element, though, is
“inadvertency.” Once it is determined that the legislative intent is to specifically
restrict speech (meaning its content), the most exacting scrutiny is applied by the
Court when evaluating the constitutionality of the legislation.248 Such scrutiny,
generally referred to as “strict scrutiny,” holds that suppression cannot take place
unless it “is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.”249 While it is possible to satisfy such a high standard,
imposition of strict scrutiny analysis generally spells the demise of the statute against
which it is imposed.
244

Boehner, 191 F.3d at 477.
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See Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 113 (the intercepted information was broadcast on radio and
television).
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Note however that the Supreme Court has generally held that the press does not have
greater First Amendment rights than an average citizen. See generally First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 (1975);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964);
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As illustrated by Florida Star and its progeny, this standard is extremely difficult
to satisfy. Fortunately, it is not applicable here. Rather, a less restrictive level of
scrutiny, “intermediate scrutiny,” is applicable in the Bartnicki case. Intermediate
scrutiny is appropriate when a statute can be characterized as a “law of general
applicability” or a “content-neutral law” – both of which describe the Federal
Wiretap Act. However, before discussing the justification for and the applicability
of “intermediate scrutiny,” it is important to specifically understand why the “strict
scrutiny” analysis of Florida Star and Daily Mail does not apply to the Bartnicki
case.
Recall for a moment the line of cases described in Section II whose holdings bore
the general theme that lawfully obtained information could not be suppressed by the
state.250 In those cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to strike down each
of the laws restricting publication of certain information. Accordingly, a limited
reading of those cases would suggest that the statute now in question should meet a
similar end. However, several points of contention distinguish those cases from
Bartnicki.
First, none of the cases in Section II dealt with information that was obtained in
an improper manner. In each case, the information was gathered either through
creative reporting or through some other legal method of newsgathering.
Conversely, the information in Bartnicki was undoubtedly acquired, at least initially,
illegally. This simple fact alone places Bartnicki well outside the scope of these
cases. It is true that the defendants in Bartnicki could argue that their failure to
participate in the actual act of interception makes their acquisition of the information
“lawful.” However, § 2511(c)’s “knowing or having reason to know” provision
places an onus of accountability on the defendants that may well characterize their
acquisition as “unlawful.” While such a determination is ultimately for the finder of
fact, the possibility of its presence amply serves to distinguish the facts in Bartnicki.
Secondly, each of the aforementioned cases either involved statutes that regulated
the specific subject of the speech or dealt with information that had already entered
the public domain.251 Obviously, the information contained in the recording that Mr.
Yocum gave to the media had not yet entered the public domain. More significantly,
though, as will be discussed below, the Federal Wiretap Act does not make
restrictions based on the content or subject matter of the speech involved. It is
completely content-neutral and, thus, distinguishable from the laws these cases
struck down.
Finally, and probably most importantly, the Court, in each of the aforementioned
cases, expressly limited its holdings to the specific facts of each case.252 Recognizing
250
See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1991); The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark
Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District Court,
430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975);
251
See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (prohibiting publication of
identity of victims of sexual offenses); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979)
(prohibiting publication of juvenile offender’s identity); Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District
Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (prohibiting publication of juvenile’s identity who had been
charged with crime); Cox Broad. Corp., v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975) (prohibiting
publication of rape victim’s identity).
252
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the Court’s refusal to state broad-based rules, the Bartnicki court noted that such
conduct “strongly suggests that a rule for undecided cases should not be derived by
negative implication from [these] reported decisions.”253 In fact, the Florida Star
Court stated that “to the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the
government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition,
thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail principle the publication of any
information so acquired.”254 Such assertions make clear the Court’s belief that
properly drafted legislation may permissibly restrict speech. Consequently,
Bartnicki is not governed by these cases and strict scrutiny is not the applicable
standard.
Rather, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review when
analyzing the civil provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act. Attempting to define
“intermediate,” the Bartnicki court commented that it “varies to some extent from
context to context . . . [b]ut it always encompasses some balancing of the state
interest and the means used to effectuate that interest.”255 In effect, the sufficiency of
the “state interest” is reduced from “compelling” to some lesser standard - perhaps
“substantial.” Dispelling the rationale for the imposition of strict scrutiny, however,
is not alone sufficient to find intermediate scrutiny applicable. Independent
justification must arise based either on the facts of the case or the manner in which
the statute in question seeks to regulate.
Congress’ intent, with respect to the disclosure provisions of the Federal Wiretap
Act, was not to suppress “speech” per se, but, rather, to preserve the privacy rights of
the citizenry as technological advancements were making it easier to impinge upon
another’s private life.256 Furthermore, the Act’s restrictions are not applicable
against a limited class as were several of the statues in the Florida Star line of cases.
Accordingly, the provisions in question can be characterized both as “generally
applicable” and “content-neutral.” These categorizations provide two justifications
for the use of the intermediate scrutiny standard in the Bartnicki case.
1. Generally Applicable Laws
Laws of general applicability are simply laws that apply with equal force against
everyone without, in this case, any specific relation to suppression of speech.
Perhaps the best example was illustrated in Cohen v. Cowles Media, in Section II,
where the Court held a newspaper liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel
for breaking a confidentiality agreement it made with a source who wished to remain
anonymous. The newspaper’s First Amendment defense failed in that case because
the doctrine upon which the plaintiff sought recovery was a “generally applicable”
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The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534
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Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 124. Interestingly enough, the Bartnicki court agrees that
“intermediate scrutiny” is the proper standard of review for the Federal Wiretap Act.
However, it bases its conclusion only on the fact the law qualifies as “content neutral” and
“generally applicable,” thus ignoring a third justification based on the reasoning of O’Brien.
See id. at 123.
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Notice that the Act prohibits many different uses of illegally obtained information. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 (1)(c), 2511(1)(d).
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law whose operation was not intended to act as a regulation on communicative
actions. Promissory estoppel, in that case, had nothing to do with suppressing
speech, yet it still managed to have an incidental effect on the newspaper’s ability to
divulge the identity of its source. Accordingly, the Court held that “generally
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report
the news.”257 More importantly, however, the Court affirmed its prior holding that
“the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of
others.”258 Therefore, the presence of a media defendant in the Bartnicki case should
not affect the Court’s analysis. Clearly, the Cohen Court refused to insulate the
media from the same scrutiny that would apply against any other individual.
The Federal Wiretap Act’s disclosure provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(c) and
(d), qualify as “generally applicable” because their prohibitions against the
disclosure of illegally obtained information do not single out speech for special
prohibition; rather, they regulate speech based on the manner in which it was
acquired. They are based on punishing the conduct that produces the speech.
Therefore, the incidental burden on speech is merely a byproduct of the conduct the
statutes seek to regulate. Accordingly, these statutes are generally applicable laws
falling under the purview of Cohen and intermediate scrutiny applies.
2. Content-Neutral Laws
Content-neutral laws regulate evenly across the board regardless of the content or
subject of the speech in question. The focus, with respect to the disclosure
provisions, is more on the manner in which the information is presented or the
manner in which it was acquired, rather than the actual content of the disclosure
itself. The statutes make no reference to any particular type of speech, nor are they
focused upon any class of speakers. As briefly mentioned earlier, this serves as one
of the primary distinctions between the Federal Wiretap Act and the laws struck
down in the Florida Star line of cases. In each of those cases, the laws in question
regulated either a particular type of speech or a particular type of speaker. Such laws
have been deemed “content-based” because they impose restrictions based on
“particular viewpoints” or particular “subject matter.”259
The Court, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,260 unanimously held that
intermediate scrutiny applied to an order prohibiting disclosure of information
obtained during discovery. The Court went on to note that the same information
could have been disclosed “as long as [it was] gained through [other] means.”261 The
focus of the prohibition was not on the speech, but upon the manner in which it was
257

Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
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Id. at 670. (citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
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Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980). Justice
Souter, concurring in Hill v. Colorado, indicated that strict scrutiny applies if a law
“suppress[es] discussion of a subject of a point of view.” 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concur).
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obtained. In other words, the civil discovery process was being protected at the
incidental expense of free speech. Similarly, the disclosure provisions of the Federal
Wiretap Act care little as to the content of the speech regulated. The primary
concern is to discourage the interception of private communication, regardless of the
type of communication. Therefore, the Act is a content-neutral law and intermediate
scrutiny applies.
E. Intermediate Scrutiny as Applied to the Federal Wiretap Act
Obviously, application of the intermediate scrutiny standard does not, however,
guarantee a finding that a statute is constitutional.262 In fact, the Bartnicki court,
which actually decided to apply intermediate scrutiny, spoke to this effect by citing
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.263 In that
case, Blackmun clearly indicated that the government’s burden “to articulate, and
support, a reasoned and significant basis” was not a task to be taken lightly.264 While
his intentions were probably to remind Congress of its limitations, it should not serve
to raise the intermediate scrutiny standard beyond the definition the Court has
expressly provided. Nevertheless, the majority in Bartnicki concluded that the
government interest sought to be protected by the Federal Wiretap Act is insufficient
to justify its incidental effect on the First Amendment, thus holding the statute
unconstitutional.265 This conclusion represents an incorrect balancing of the interests
involved and should be reversed by the United States Supreme Court.
The balancing test to be applied under intermediate scrutiny evaluates the statute
to see if “it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest . . . [which] is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression . . . and [whose application’s]
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”266 The civil provisions of the Federal
Wiretap Act satisfy this test.
1. The Substantial Governmental Interest
Typically, a pure “governmental interest” involves somewhat of a self-serving
governmental concern, legitimate or otherwise, sought to enable more effective
control over a state or the nation. Admittedly, this assertion is an overgeneralization,
but it would be fair to conclude that it may embody the average citizen’s perception
of what a “governmental interest” may be. It is important to note, however, that the
“governmental interest” with respect to the Federal Wiretap Act might more
appropriately be termed a “citizen’s interest” in that the disclosure provisions seek
not to protect the government, but to protect the privacy of the citizenry. Generally
speaking, then, the interests can be identified as the “constitutionally protected right
to privacy.” Therefore, the interest’s potency should be enhanced due to its genuine
public aim and its established constitutional legitimacy.
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As mentioned in Section I, Congress’ purpose in passing the Federal Wiretap
Act, as amended, was to protect privacy interests with respect to wire, oral and
electronic communications. Uncontested provisions of the Act include general
prohibitions against the interception of such communications absent a warrant or
some other form of appropriate justification.267 Of course, these provisions are
hailed as the “protectors of privacy” and the “watchdogs of liberty” in a world of
modern technology where average citizens engage in high-tech, “James Bond-like”
activities. What follows, however, is that general prohibitions on interception alone,
while good, will not effectively guard the interests the Act intends to protect. Absent
a prohibition on disclosure, an individual’s privacy may still be violated – only at a
later point in time, and possibly by a different person. Accordingly, by prohibiting
disclosure of information obtained in violation of the Act, one of the incentives to
intercept in the first place is greatly reduced. In other words, without the prohibition
on disclosure, the Act’s ability to achieve its ultimate goal is without proper support.
As evidenced by the Framers’ Fourth Amendment prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures, a citizen’s expectation of privacy was, and
remains, a paramount concern. Recalling the Supreme Court’s progression from
Olmstead to Katz, in Section I, the Court’s recognition of the “threat” of
technological advancement becomes apparent. It follows, then, that the Federal
Wiretap Act’s attempt to further protect private communications, both by expanding
to meet the circumstances of the times (such as cellular phones and the like) and by
reducing the incentive to intercept (via the disclosure provisions), is merely the
logical extension of the Framers’ intent. Whether one agrees with the extent of this
assertion or not, the fact of the matter is that privacy is a “substantial governmental
(citizen) interest.”
2. Interest is Unrelated to Suppression of Free Expression
By its very definition, a “content-neutral” law bears no interest to the suppression
of free speech.268 Once an interest to that effect arises, the law is reclassified and
exposed to the strict scrutiny standard mentioned previously. Having already
defined the Federal Wiretap Act as a content-neutral law, this portion of the
intermediate scrutiny test is per se satisfied. However, because additional arguments
exist to bolster the position, they will be briefly discussed.
The language of § 2511(c), one of the sections in dispute, provides what is
perhaps the best evidence that no direct attempt to regulate speech exists. While it
does effectively seal the lips of those in possession of illegally obtained information,
it does so based not on the information they hold, but based on the manner in which
it was obtained. Again, this speaks directly to the content-neutrality of the provision.
More so, however, it indicates that the intent of the law is to protect the privacy of
the recorded speaker rather than to restrict the speech of the information holder. Of
course, speech is incidentally burdened. To hold otherwise would be to place one’s
head in the sand. However, as previously discussed, speech is not an absolute right
and may be incidentally burdened under proper circumstances.
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The Court in United States v. Nixon,269 stated that “human experience teaches that
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with
a concern for appearances and for their own interests.”270 What First Amendment
advocates fail to realize is that allowing disclosure may result in greater suppression
of speech than prohibiting disclosure. As the Nixon Court so eloquently explained, if
private conversations are not protected from broad distribution it stands to reason
that people will speak less freely.271 Therefore, to hold the disclosure provisions
unconstitutional may well do more harm to the First Amendment than would
otherwise occur. Nevertheless, the fact that the provisions arguably enhance speech
rather than detract from it serves as strong evidence of their non-suppressive intent.
Conversely, one might argue that upholding the disclosure provisions of the Act
will result in a “chilling effect” on speech because the press will be fearful of
potential liability connected with “suspect” information. While such a contention
seems valid on its face, further consideration reveals that it is without merit. The
media has always considered accuracy a priority when reporting information. In so
doing, particular media sources establish integrity and reliability in the eyes of the
public. Accordingly, information received by news sources is not simply received
and then quickly put into print in an ad hoc fashion. During the fact checking
process it is fair to assume that a reporter would be made aware of or “have reason to
know” that given information may have come from an illegal interception. If not,
then liability is removed from the equation under the very language of the provisions
themselves. Remember, this requirement does not impose a duty to learn. It only
imposes liability based on knowledge at the time of acquisition. Therefore, it is not
likely that a truly innocent media source will be held liable if sued for disclosure.
Accordingly, the “chilling effect” argument is void of merit and should not factor
into the Court’s analysis.
3. Incidental Restrictions are Minimal
The third prong of the O’Brien test demands that the government intrusion, albeit
incidental, be limited in scope so as not to intrude upon First Amendment freedoms
more than necessary. Such a requirement bears analytical merit because it foresees
the possibility of inappropriate encroachments that cleverly drafted legislation may
achieve under the guise of content-neutrality. Perhaps the best way to apply this
prong of the test is not to evaluate the scope of the statute’s First Amendment
restrictions, but, rather, attempt to identify a lesser intrusive manner (with respect to
the First Amendment) under which the statute’s goals might still be achieved.
Should a lesser means of encroachment exist, the statute may fail this prong of the
test. Note, however, that Supreme Court precedent has not required a regulation to
be the absolute least speech-restrictive measure of advancing the state’s interest.272 It
need only be shown that the state’s interest is less likely to be achieved absent the
regulation.273
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As has been cited numerous times, the purpose of the Federal Wiretap Act is to
preserve the confidentiality of private oral, wire, or electronic communications. To
effectively accomplish this goal, restrictions cannot rest solely on the interceptive act
alone. To do so would enable the interceptor to merely pass along the fruits of his
labor to a third party who could evade liability under the cover of statutory silence.
While civil liability and criminal prosecution may well occur with respect to the
interceptor, such results minimally contribute to the ultimate end the statute seeks to
attain.
Understandably, when information of public significance comes to light,
regardless of how it was obtained, the general reaction is that suppression should not
occur. This begs the question as to why the statute could not be written to exclude
liability when the intercepted information is of “public significance.” Beyond the
obvious problem of defining “publicly significant information” on a case-by-case
basis lies the larger problem of transforming the statue from “content-neutral” to
“content-based.” As has been demonstrated in this Note, to base the government’s
ability to suppress speech on the subject of the information would reclassify the
statute in a manner that would require strict First Amendment scrutiny. Under such
circumstances it is almost certain that the statute would fail and possibly be removed
from achieving its goal. Accordingly, such an alternative method of statutory
construction is unacceptable.
Yet another possibility is to carve out a media exception that would hold the
press to a different standard of review than the general public. To do so would
alleviate First Amendment concerns significantly because the press is the primary
vehicle through which Free Speech rights are exercised. This alternative, however,
faces two primary obstacles. First, suppression, or lack of its enforcement, based on
the speaker’s identity comes dangerously close to qualifying a statute as a contentbased regulation. For the same reasons that subject-oriented restrictions require
heightened scrutiny, providing a special privilege for a certain entity, while
maintaining suppressive control over others, demands the same level of First
Amendment scrutiny. Secondly, and more tangibly, the Court, as cited in Bohner v.
McDermott, has held on numerous occasions that the press has no greater First
Amendment protection than any other individual. Accordingly, based on logic as
well as precedent, to judicially rewrite the statute so as to enable the media to evade
civil liability for disclosure of illegally intercepted information would not be
appropriate.
While other options may exist, the aforementioned fairly represent the type of
alternative restrictive measures that First Amendment advocates might argue are
best. If they are right then the statute may fail the third prong of the O’Brien
analysis. However, as was demonstrated, each alternative is fatally flawed in that
each fails to advance the ultimate goal the drafters of the statute intended – Privacy.
The civil provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act strike an appropriate balance
between objective based restrictions and adequate punitive measures. Accordingly,
they are sufficiently narrow so as not to unnecessarily impinge upon the First
Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Often times, it is easy to predict how the Court will rule on a given issue due to
the known ideological positions of its members. Generally, the first step in such a
prediction involves a simple identification of the issue itself with respect to its liberal
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or conservative moorings. Unlike many cases, however, Bartnicki v. Vopper
presents a novel question arising from the collision of two fundamentally protected
rights. Rights, incidentally, whose proponents fall on both sides of the political and
ideological spectrum. It is important to recognize that support for one interest over
the other does not necessarily represent a categorical denial of the latter right’s
significance or constitutional legitimacy. People, including judges, regularly
advocate on behalf of free speech and privacy simultaneously, all the while believing
that their subscription to both is not hypocritical. Accordingly, it is completely
understandable, while seemingly illogical, that various Justices may ardently support
both rights despite their present opposition in this case.
As was mentioned at the outset, co-existence of these two seminal rights, unless
carefully defined, does seem improbable. However, the requisite definition, as has
been demonstrated, flows from the proper application of intermediate scrutiny via
the O’Brien analysis. No right is absolute. Even the most important right of all, life,
may be taken so long as due process is afforded. So is the case with speech. In no
way did Congress intend to suppress information beyond that which was absolutely
necessary to meet the privacy objectives the statute was enacted to protect. This
statute is clearly content-neutral and should survive First Amendment scrutiny so as
to provide the citizenry with the statutory assurance that their most intimate and
private communications will be zealously protected. To hold otherwise will only
discourage the candid and spontaneous expression free speech advocates so typically
fight to protect. Therefore, it is in the best interests of both constitutional rights to
uphold the statute and reverse the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in the case
of Bartnicki v. Vopper.
VII. EPILOGUE
As mentioned in Footnote 11, authorship of this Note pre-dated the Supreme
Court’s decision in the Bartnicki case. Publication, however, will significantly postdate the Court’s decision due to the lengthiness of the publication process.
Accordingly, this section provides a brief synopsis of the Court’s decision in
Bartnicki.
On May 21, 2001, in a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Stevens (concurrence by
Breyer, joined by O’Conner), the United States Supreme Court decided Bartnicki v.
Vopper,274 affirming the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Bartnicki v.
Vopper.275 In sum, the majority determined that the civil provisions of the Federal
Wiretap Act violated the First Amendment. In other words, Congress’ good faith
attempt to protect the public’s privacy rights by prohibiting third-party disclosure of
information gained in violation of federal wiretapping laws, according to the
majority, ran afoul of the First Amendment rights of the third-party discloser.
Justice Steven’s opinion presented no real surprises with respect to its analytical
approach. It began with three factual assumptions, the last of which undoubtedly
played a critical role in the Court’s decision: (1) that respondents played no part in
the illegal interception, (2) that their access to the information on the tapes was
obtained lawfully, and (3) that the subject matter of the conversations on the tapes
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was a matter of public concern.276 It then correctly characterized the statutes as
content-neutral laws of general applicability, thereby reducing the level of
constitutional scrutiny to be applied.277 Next, however, it determined that the statue’s
“naked prohibition” against disclosure of illegally intercepted information, a
characterization which may be somewhat overreaching in light of the statue’s
“knowing” requirements, constituted a clear regulation of pure speech.278 Having
determined that the respondents’ conduct qualified as the very type of speech the
First Amendment seeks to protect, the Court surprisingly required that governmental
interests of the “highest order” be present in order to justify the statutes restriction on
speech.279
In short, the Court recognized that the statutes clearly qualified as content-neutral
laws; but, nevertheless, found a way to raise the “governmental interests” prong of
the intermediate scrutiny test to the highest level, so as to justify its finding of their
insufficiency. Essentially, the majority identified the proper standard (intermediate
scrutiny), but applied the improper standard (strict scrutiny), a point overtly made by
Justice Renquist in his dissent (joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas).
Identifying two governmental interests – (1) the removal of an incentive for parties
to intercept private conversations, and (2) the minimization of harm to persons
whose conversations have been illegally intercepted – the Court deemed them
insufficient to justify encroachment upon the First Amendment. Simply put, “in this
case, privacy concerns [gave] way when balanced against the interest in publishing
matters of public importance.”280
As has been mentioned repeatedly, this case presented a clash between two very
important constitutional rights – privacy and speech. Sacrificing one at the expense
of the other, while difficult, was unavoidable. Logically, then, one might argue that
regardless of what the Court decided, the case was a victory for civil rights. While
that may be true, this author strongly believes that such a circumstance requires,
more than ever, strict adherence by the Court to the proper standard of review. Here,
the Court merely paid lip service to the content-neutral character of the statutes,
thereafter applying a strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate them.
Had the Court actually applied the test to which it purportedly subscribed,
perhaps the civil provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act would be alive to protect an
interceptee’s interest in his free speech rights. Indeed, while Bartnicki may seem to
be a victory for the First Amendment, it is also a defeat in that protecting the
disclosure of intercepted information will undoubtedly chill the public’s willingness
to speak freely.
JESS GAMIERE
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